



# BEYOND NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION

NEWSLETTER FOR STRENGTHENING AWARENESS OF NUCLEAR ABOLITION WITH SEPTEMBER 2012 ARTICLES

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### **Pressure Mounts on Nuclear States to Ratify Test Ban**



UNITED NATIONS - The United States and a small group of other nuclear-armed nations are apparently coming under increasing pressure to accept the international community's resolve to legally ban nuclear testing without delay. "The elimination of nuclear weapons is the ultimate guarantee that they will never be used, and the best non-proliferation mechanism," Carl Bildt, the Swedish

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
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<http://www.nuclearabolition.net/documents/Toward a World without Nuclear Weapons.pdf>



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## **In-Depth Reports**

### **Pressure Mounts on Nuclear States to Ratify Test Ban**

By HAIDER RIZVI



UNITED NATIONS (IPS) - The United States and a small group of other nuclear-armed nations are apparently coming under increasing pressure to accept the international community's resolve to legally ban nuclear testing without delay.

"The elimination of nuclear weapons is the ultimate guarantee that they will never be used, and the best non-proliferation mechanism," Carl Bildt, the Swedish foreign minister, told delegates at a high-level ministerial meeting held here Thursday in support of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

The Swedish minister, who was joined by his counterparts from Australia, the Netherlands, Indonesia, Japan, Finland, Canada and other nations, added: "Ending nuclear testing is a critical step toward nuclear disarmament."

The treaty prohibits "any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion" anywhere in the world. Opened for signature in September 1996, the treaty has been signed by 183 nations and ratified by 157. However, it cannot be enforced without ratification by 44 countries that had nuclear power or research reactors when the CTBT was negotiated.

Most of those nations have ratified the treaty, but the United States, China, India, Pakistan, North Korea, Israel, Iran, and Egypt remain unwilling to do so. In 2009, U.S. President Barack Obama declared his intention to seek Senate reconsideration of the treaty. The administration has given no firm timeframe for action.

In order to verify compliance with its provisions, the treaty establishes a global network of monitoring facilities and allows for on-site inspections of suspicious events. The overall accord contains a preamble, 17 treaty articles, two annexes, and a protocol for verification procedures.

In their joint statement, the foreign ministers urged countries that have not signed and or ratified the treaty not to cause further delay in the implementation process. The CTBTO Executive Secretary Tibor Tóth provided the historical context to the meeting against the background of the 50th anniversary of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

"Fifty years ago, nearly to the day, the Soviet Union and the United States brought the world to the edges of the abyss. However, as the tensions had reached the boiling point in Washington, Moscow, and countless other world capitals, a moment of clarity arose in realisation of the need to diminish the occurrence of such threats," he said.

In the midst of the crisis, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev proposed to U.S. President John F. Kennedy a resolution to the Cuban Missile Crisis in a "parallel fashion" with the cessation of nuclear tests. This was an opportunity, he said, to "present humanity with a fine gift," Tóth said. "It was clear then as it is today, that nuclear testing poisons the natural and political environment."

For his part, U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon told nations that are outside the fold of the test ban treaty, "You are failing to live up to your responsibility as a member of the international community."

At the meeting, Pulitzer Prize-winner Richard Rhodes, author of the play "Reykjavik", described the risk of nuclear extinction as human-made and said that a human-made solution could be found, as the Reykjavik summit had demonstrated in 1986.

Recalling that In Reykjavik, Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev had come close to an agreement to abolish their nuclear arsenals, Rhodes said, "A nuclear-weapon free world is not a utopian dream."

During his encounter with the Japanese media at the sidelines of the General Assembly meeting, the Japanese foreign minister stressed the need for an accelerated monitoring system. His is the only nation which actually faced massive destruction of life as a result of nuclear bombing by the United States in 1945. ➡



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While both Iran and North Korea came under scathing criticism for their nuclear-related activities, no one spoke about Israel, India and Pakistan, three nations that possess hundreds of nuclear weapons and have shown no intent to join the CTBT.

Nor was there any discussion of reports that the U.S. is engaged in modernising its nuclear weapons.

Records show that in the five decades before the CTBT, over 2,000 nuclear tests shook and irradiated the Earth. The post-CTBT world saw only a handful of nuclear tests: those by India and Pakistan in 1998 and North Korea in 2006 and 2009.

The treaty bans all nuclear explosions by everyone, everywhere: on the Earth's surface, in the atmosphere, in outer space, underwater and underground. In particular, it stresses the need for the continued reduction of nuclear weapons worldwide with the ultimate goal of their elimination.

The preamble recognises that a CTBT will constitute an effective measure of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation by "constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and ending the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons." It further recognises that a test ban will constitute "a meaningful step in the realization of a systematic process to achieve nuclear disarmament."

Under Article VII, each state-party has the right to propose amendments to the treaty after its entry into force. Any proposed amendment requires the approval of a simple majority of states-parties at an amendment conference with no party casting a negative vote.

Asked for their views on the amendment process relating to the so-called "peaceful nuclear explosions", the foreign ministers from Australia, Japan, and Indonesia seemed to have no answer. They all looked each other and kept silent.

The Australian foreign minister, Bob Carr, however, later told IPS that he would "check into it".

According to CTBTO preparatory commission, under Article VIII, a conference will be held 10 years after the treaty's entry into force to review the implementation of its provisions, including the preamble. At this review conference, any state-party may request that the issue of so-called "peaceful nuclear explosions" (PNEs) be put on the agenda.

However, the CTBTO's presumes that PNEs remain prohibited unless "certain virtually insurmountable obstacles are overcome. First, the review conference must decide without objection that PNEs may be permitted, and then an amendment to the treaty must also be approved."

The CTBTO explains that such an amendment must also "demonstrate that no military benefits would result from such explosions. This double hurdle makes it extremely unlikely that peaceful nuclear explosions would ever be permitted under the treaty."

According to the CTBTO, from the 1960s to the end of the 1980s, the Soviet Union and the United States in particular pursued the notion of "Peaceful Nuclear Explosions" (PNE's) "for economic reasons, with mixed results".

Of the nearly 2,050 nuclear explosions detonated in the world between 1945 and 1996, over 150 or approximately seven percent were for peaceful purposes.

Experts say PNE's are qualitatively no different from weapons tests in terms of their adverse effects on health and the environment. Also the explosive device itself has the same technical characteristics. [IPS - September 27, 2012] □

Original: <http://www.ipsnews.net/2012/09/pressure-mounts-on-nuclear-states-to-ratify-test-ban/>



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## What Others Say

### **ATOM Launched to Buttress Nuke Abolition**

By ALYN WARE\*



NEW YORK (IDN) - The ATOM Project, an exciting new initiative to build global support for nuclear abolition, was launched at a parliamentary assembly in Astana, Kazakhstan on August 29, the International Day Against Nuclear Tests.

The project, entitled Abolish Testing: Our Mission (ATOM), highlights the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons – particularly the nuclear tests conducted in Kazakhstan that have adversely affected the health and lives of nearly 2 million people. The images of the survivors, though sometimes difficult to witness, are featured in the campaign in order to raise awareness surrounding the damage nuclear testing can cause.

Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev launched the project at the opening plenary of the assembly which included participants from over 70 parliaments from around the world including from nuclear weapons possessing states and nuclear allies. The assembly was organised by Parliamentarians for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament (PNND), the parliament of Kazakhstan, and the Nazarbayev Centre.

"We have an opportunity to once more remind the world about the tragic consequences of the nuclear testing, and push the global community towards more decisive actions to achieve final and definitive ban of such testing," said President Nazarbayev. "In this regard, Kazakhstan launches today the International campaign The ATOM Project."

German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle commended Kazakhstan at the assembly for launching the project and gave his support.

Westerwelle emphasized the unprecedented importance of disarmament and non-proliferation in an ever more interconnected world. He explicitly commended the country for its role in the pursuit of a world without nuclear weapons. After the Soviet Union had been broken up, Kazakhstan decided against nuclear weapons and dismantled its arsenal. Westerwelle highlighted the fact that, "Although nearly 500 nuclear weapons were tested in Kazakhstan during the Soviet era, Central Asia has now become a region free of nuclear weapons," he said.

Honorary ATOM Project Ambassador Karipbek Kuyukov, an heroic survivor from the effects of nuclear tests, spoke at the assembly about the horrific impact of the tests on the lives of Kazakhstan peoples – "Many of my relations have died from the radiation from the nuclear tests," he said. "In one family first the father then the mother then all the children passed away – the whole family of 10. I myself have no arms to hug you, but a heart as big as the open space of Kazakhstan ready to embrace the world for peace and nuclear disarmament."

Nuke testing genie: seal the bottle

Dr Lassina Zerbo, representing the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO) said: "Since the CTBT was adopted in 1996, the genie of nuclear testing has virtually been pushed back into the bottle. In contrast to some 400 explosions every decade since 1945, there were only two tests in the last decade. However, until we seal the bottle once and for all, until we bring the Treaty into force, none of us can feel safe." ☺

\*Alyn Ware is Global Coordinator of Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (PNND), based at its UN office in New York. This article from PNND is being re-published by arrangement with the writer.

Portrait image: Alyn Ware | Credit: [disarmsecure.org](http://disarmsecure.org)



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Douglas Roche, founding chair of PNND and the Middle Powers Initiative (MPI), called on parliamentarians to strengthen their actions in their legislatures – guided by the Parliamentary Appeal for Nuclear Abolition adopted at the assembly. Roche outlined the MPI Framework Forum – an informal process of governments exploring what would be required for establishing the framework for a nuclear-weapons-free world – and announced the next meeting to be hosted by the German Foreign Ministry in Berlin in February 2013.

Roche also called for a new effort of heads of government – similar to the Six Nation Initiative of 1984-1989 – to elevate the call and commence the process to achieve a nuclear-weapons-free world. His proposal was explored in more detail by Jonathan Granoff, President of the Global Security Institute in a subsequent panel of the assembly.

This assembly in Kazakhstan, which included a field trip to the former Soviet nuclear test site in Semipalatinsk, has energized parliamentarians from around the world to step up their action to abolish nuclear weapons, including through the spread of nuclear-weapon-free zones and the promotion of a global treaty to ban nuclear weapons. [IDN-InDepthNews – September 5, 2012]

## How Pakistan Made the Atomic Bomb

By MALEEHA LODHI\*

KARACHI (IDN) - The title of the first book (Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb) that authoritatively chronicles Pakistan's nuclear history comes from a famous remark by (former Prime Minister) Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, architect of the country's atomic programme. In an interview with the Manchester Guardian in 1965, he said if India built the bomb, "we will eat grass, even go hungry, but we will get one of our own. We have no other choice."

Brig (ret'd) Feroz Khan's ... book (to be published in November 2012) tells the riveting story of the country's quest for a nuclear capability and the challenges it faced to acquire this. It offers a fascinating portrait of the interplay between geostrategic shifts, key political and scientific figures and evolution of strategic beliefs, which shaped Pakistan's nuclear decisions.

This insider account, from one long associated with the programme, is more than an addition to the literature, which mostly casts the Pakistani bomb in a negative light. It is the most detailed depiction of an arduous journey that reached its destination in the 1980s and 1990s. As the author recently told me, he was motivated to narrate this because of the relentless disinformation campaign directed against Pakistan's capability. The result is a compelling tale of how it took the country twenty-five years of gruelling effort to build a strategic capability and even longer to transform that into an operational deterrent with an effective delivery system.

Khan doesn't avoid dealing with what he characterises as the "darkest chapter of the country's nuclear history" when the A Q Khan proliferation network was uncovered. The chapter devoted to this explains how a man revered by his compatriots turned a procurement network used to advance Pakistan's nuclear programme into an export enterprise that brought the country infamy from which it is still to recover. ☺

\*Dr Maleeha Lodhi is a journalist, special adviser to the Jang Group/Geo, academic and diplomat from Pakistan. She was Pakistan's High Commissioner to the UK and Ambassador to the United States. She has also been a member of the UN Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Disarmament. This book review first appeared in the print edition of Pakistan's News International from Pakistan on August 31, 2012 and is re-published in view of the importance of the book.

\*\*Feroz H Khan, Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb, Stanford University Press, 2012.

Portrait image: Maleeha Lodhi | Credit: The News International





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Although the chapter brings new facts to light, they are no more shocking than the network's discovery in 2004. They mainly pertain to how A Q Khan used the prime minister's office – even after he was removed from his organisation for engaging in suspicious activity by General Pervez Musharraf – to write to the ruler of another country in pursuit of proliferation activities. This agonising episode spurred Pakistan into improving its command and control system and establishing robust personnel reliability mechanisms.

The book's central concern however is not proliferation. It is to explain how and why Pakistan surmounted numerous obstacles to master the nuclear fuel cycle, pursuing both the uranium enrichment and plutonium route, especially after 1974 when the international nonproliferation regime tried to stop – and punish – Pakistan for India's nuclear explosion. The book's core thesis is that the more the US-led international community pressured, sanctioned and denied Pakistan access to technology, the more this galvanised national resolve and accelerated the programme.

In demystifying this quest Khan explodes several myths popularised by outsiders especially about the programme being 'stolen' from the West or 'enabled' by China. This he says trivialises the indigenous contribution of Pakistan's scientists. Technical help from China was only sought when there was an impasse. He credits the acquisition of nuclear capability not to one person but to the collective determination of hundreds of people in the civil-military establishment, but above all, the scientific community who believed in achieving nuclear self-sufficiency.

### National consensus

This pursuit was backed by a rare national consensus. This survived changes of government and domestic turmoil that punctuated Pakistan's political history. Khan also describes the epic rivalry between two key nuclear institutions: the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission and what later became Khan Research Laboratories. While endemic professional jealousy slowed the nuclear endeavour, it also spurred innovation that produced eventual success. Some leaders even encouraged the 'clash of the Khans'- A Q and Munir Ahmed Khan, who headed the PAEC.

In tracking the early history, the author casts Ayub Khan as a cautious leader who kept the programme focused on peaceful pursuits and tried to curb the ambition of the nuclear lobby, led by Bhutto, Agha Shahi, and Aziz Ahmed. The split between these two camps "drove Pakistan's policy choices". The rise and fall of Ayub and Bhutto and two top scientists, Dr Abdus Salam and Dr Ishrat Usmani determined the country's nuclear journey.

1971 and the 'never again' paradigm that emerged after defeat and dismemberment proved pivotal in the decision to build the bomb. "Pakistan's humiliation would lay the foundation for a shift in the once peaceful nature of the nuclear programme," writes Khan. The 1971 debacle and India's 1974 nuclear test turned a minority viewpoint into consensus on the imperative of acquiring nuclear weapons. The more India's nuclear activities were internationally tolerated the greater was Pakistan's sense of discrimination.

What ultimately determined nuclear success was the cadre of scientists and engineers whose talent was tapped in the country's early years and who were motivated by the resolve not to let India's strategic advances go "unanswered".

While Khan regards Pakistan's nuclear journey unique in many respects – "no other nuclear power acquired a nuclear capability in the face of efforts to derail the programme" – he also points to similarities with the motivation and rationale of other nuclear powers. All sought the 'ultimate weapon' as a response to insecurity and 'balancing' against foreign military or political threats. He identifies three common themes among nuclear aspirants: national humiliation, international isolation, and national identity. They were recurrent themes in Pakistan's case, providing the basis for its strategic perceptions.

### Pakistan-US relations

The rollercoaster nature of Pakistan-US relations emerges as an important, explanatory factor in the evolution of the country's nuclear effort. This unedifying engagement- and the mutual disappointments that accompanied it – reinforced Islamabad's thinking that in confronting security threats Pakistan could only rely on itself. Moreover decades of discriminatory sanctions, embargos and coercive pressure left many Pakistanis with the impression that its capability was also being targeted for its "Muslimness". ☹



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An aspect of the programme's early history revealed in the book is how little the military initially had to do with it. The author depicts GHQ as a later convert to the nuclear idea, with 1974 becoming the defining moment. It was Ghulam Ishaq Khan who from the beginning was "by far the greatest silent patron and contributor" to Pakistan's nuclear programme. When the 1993 political crisis culminated in the removal of the prime minister and president, on his last day in office GIK reluctantly handed over all nuclear-related documents to the new chief of army staff General Abdul Waheed Kakar. This, says Khan, marked the first time the army assumed responsibility for the nuclear programme.

Any history summarising decades of nuclear endeavour can be expected to contain gaps in the account. Those actively involved in the project will probably find many. But for this scribe the book fails to acknowledge the role of Pakistani diplomats especially in the crucial years leading up to the nuclear tests in 1998. This was the period of wide-ranging sanctions and unprecedented US pressure to compel Pakistan to change course. The front line role of diplomats like Munir Akram in framing and articulating Pakistan's nuclear policy as well as shaping its negotiating position in key international forums deserved special mention. The impression left by the book that soldiers, not diplomats, crafted and conducted nuclear diplomacy to fend off international pressure is not accurate. The foreign ministry played an impressive role in this regard.

The book nevertheless offers a tribute to all who silently or stridently ensured the success of the project. But the nuclear story inescapably raises a what-if question on a fundamental issue. If the country's economic progress had received similar priority and been pursued with the same discipline and consensus Pakistan would not be the shambles that it is today. This irony doesn't escape the author. He frequently reminds the reader that while possession of a nuclear capability provided Pakistan a partial check against external aggression, it did nothing – nor could it – to address the greater risks to its security and stability, from internal turmoil and conflict.  
[IDN-InDepthNews – September 2, 2012] □

## The Importance of Gender in Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

By ESPEN BARTH EIDE | NORWAY'S FOREIGN MINISTER

*Following are excerpts of the speech by Norway's Foreign Minister at 'The Women, Disarmament, Non-Proliferation and Arms Control' meeting in New York on September 25, 2012.*

[...] I want to thank Trinidad and Tobago for this timely initiative, and for tabling the resolution on women's role in disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation in 2010. Ten years after the adoption of Security Council resolution 1325, the General Assembly has finally addressed this issue. It was long overdue.

Resolution 1325 has influenced our thinking, our norms and our attitudes in fundamental ways, but there are still huge gaps in its implementation on the ground. The realm of hard politics and security is far from being gender-sensitive.

While we have seen progress in some areas, the gender perspective has largely been absent from disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation processes.

A stronger gender approach to disarmament could give much needed momentum to the multilateral processes that have largely become irrelevant. Not only do we need a stronger gender perspective. We also need to take the humanitarian dimension into account.

If we look at the disarmament processes in which women and civil society have played vital roles, we see that new and successful approaches have been found. The processes leading to the Mine Ban Convention and to the Convention on Cluster Munitions were successful because women and civil society actively participated and drove the processes forward. And because it was recognised that the humanitarian costs outweigh the military utility of these weapons. ➔





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## What Others Say



Map shows where the Norwegian People's Aid works

The next step must be to take into account the humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons. That is why Norway will hold a conference in Oslo in the spring of 2013 to focus on the impact of nuclear detonations, whatever their cause.

In our partnerships with organisations on the ground, we emphasise the gender perspective. Programmes that take into account the different needs and priorities of men, women, girls and boys, and that adjust their work accordingly, tend to be more effective. And after all, it is effectiveness on the ground that is the real measure of success.

This is why we support efforts to improve the living conditions of women and girls affected by armed violence. And why we try to strengthen women's participation in humanitarian disarmament processes, and integrate the gender perspective in projects on land mines, cluster munitions and the control of small arms.

Our partners in the field, such as Norwegian People's Aid and Action on Armed Violence, point to the added value of having both men and women in mine clearance programmes. Further, in projects working with cultural perceptions, we see that women are able to change attitudes and behaviour relating to weapon use and violence.

Women living in conflict and war-torn societies are often disproportionately affected by armed gender-based violence. Their perspectives must be included in international instruments such as an Arms Trade Treaty and the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons for them to be truly relevant.

Norway is a strong defender of women's participation in preventing and resolving conflicts. This is a matter of basic human rights and democratic principles. It is also a better way to build peace. Women's participation in peace processes can lead to broader and stronger local ownership and more comprehensive agreements.

Still, when we take a look at peace and reconciliation processes around the world, we see that women are few and far between. It is the warring parties that are trusted, not only to end the war, but also to build the peace. There are too many examples of weak peace agreements and faltering disarmament processes. There are too many situations where war has ended, but women continue to suffer from gender-based and sexual violence, intensified by a high number of guns and arms in their communities. Emboldened by weapons and power, former combatants continue to rape and violate girls and women with impunity. This has far-reaching implications for efforts to build peace, security and development.

We need new momentum and new approaches to disarmament, arms-control and non-proliferation. Let's listen to women and civil society. Let's listen to those who live with the consequences of conflict and violence every day, they just might have the solutions we need. ☐



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## What Others Say

### Building Partnerships for Disarmament

By ROSE GOTTEMOELLER | U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Acting Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security

*Following are excerpts remarks by Gottemoeller at the 'Moscow Nonproliferation Conference: Nuclear Energy, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation' in Moscow on September 7, 2012.*

[...] We are fast approaching the 50th anniversary of the Cuban Missile Crisis. At that time, the tension and pressure of the Cold War had built up so much that our nations teetered on the edge of annihilation. Thanks to the resolute and sober judgment of our leaders, we were able to surmount that crisis and we learned to mitigate the tension in our relationship through constant – and sometimes painstaking – communication.

To say that things have changed dramatically since October 1962 is an understatement. The Cold War ended and the world as we know it has been forever changed. It is hard to imagine that my predecessor who served at the State Department in 1962 could have predicted that 50 years later, I would be standing in Moscow, talking to a group of Russian and international policymakers, as well as to academics, experts and students about how we can work together on disarmament.

#### Thinking About the Next Steps in Bilateral Reductions

In Prague in 2009, when President Obama laid out his vision for the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons, he made clear that the road would be long and the goal may not be reached in his lifetime. But, in order to achieve this vision, we will need to follow a step by step process in which we maintain nuclear stability at the same time that we pursue responsible reductions in our nuclear arsenals through arms control.

The New Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty or New START was a first step on this path. When New START is fully implemented, we will be at the lowest levels of deployed strategic nuclear warheads since the 1950s – pre-Cuban Missile Crisis. The implementation of the Treaty is going very well, and the Treaty's robust verification system is providing the predictability and mutual confidence that will be essential to any future nuclear reduction plans.

We are now spending a lot of time thinking about next steps in arms control. I sometimes refer to it as a homework period, which is not a bad term for what we are doing. We are looking at fundamentals and lessons learned, as we work to develop new policies to advance our security.

#### Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons

We would like to further the partnership between the United States and the Russian Federation on these issues. The entry into force of New START was an important step on the road, but not the end of the process.

One of the items on the agenda is the reduction of nonstrategic nuclear weapons (NSNW) and it is clear that there will be new challenges facing us. Although the 1990 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives reduced the readiness and numbers of NSNW, we have not tried to formally limit non-deployed or non-strategic nuclear weapons before, which President Obama called for the day he signed New START. We are thinking about how we would verify reductions in those categories; experts have different ideas about what terms like 'non-strategic' even mean. Even more complicated: the lower the numbers of nuclear weapons and the smaller the components, the harder it will be to effectively monitor compliance.

That is why, over the course of the past few years, the Administration has taken a number of steps towards charting a path to reach this goal. We have been conducting internal reviews, while also reviewing this matter with our allies, including our NATO Allies, through the Deterrence and Defense Posture Review (DDPR). We have also been engaging with our Russian colleagues in a strategic stability dialogue. ➔





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In approving the Deterrence and Defense Posture Review at Chicago this past May, the Allies determined that NATO's current posture meets the criteria for an effective deterrence and defense posture. NATO has already dramatically reduced its holdings of and reliance on nuclear weapons, but has indicated that it is prepared to consider further reducing its requirement for nonstrategic nuclear weapons assigned to the Alliance. The context is important here: NATO would consider such steps in the context of reciprocal steps by Russia, taking into account the greater Russian stockpiles of nonstrategic nuclear weapons stationed in the Euro-Atlantic area.

The Allies have supported and encouraged the United States and Russia to continue their mutual efforts to promote strategic stability, enhance transparency, and further reduce their nuclear weapons in every category.

NATO Allies look forward to developing and exchanging transparency and confidence-building ideas with Russia, with the goal of enhancing European security and stability by increasing mutual understanding of NATO's and Russia's non-strategic nuclear force postures in Europe.

I have been quite interested in how many non-governmental organizations are producing research and policy suggestions on the subject of NSNW. They have come up with ideas, starting with minimal transparency measures- such as exchanging white papers, moving on to other types of information exchanges; then hosting site visits to current or abandoned facilities; and conducting mock inspections. On this broad spectrum, these are all ideas worth thinking about.

### ISAB Report

Beyond specific actions items, we are also exploring how we view stability and security between our nations through a post-Cold War lens. The State Department's International Security Advisory Board, or ISAB, is helping us with this kind of "big thinking." This Federal Advisory Committee was established to provide the Department of State with a continuing source of independent insight, advice and innovation on scientific, military, diplomatic, political, and public diplomacy aspects of arms control, disarmament, international security, and nonproliferation. One of the ISAB's tasks was to undertake a study of how the United States could pursue and manage a transition from a security foundation of mutual assured destruction to a security foundation of mutual assured stability, characterized by increasingly interdependent states having incentives to cooperate on political, military, and economic issues, thereby reducing the need for adversarial approaches to managing security challenges.

I would like to give credit to my predecessor, Ellen Tauscher, who coined the term "mutual assured stability."

Among the topics that the ISAB was asked to examine and assess in this area were the possible components of mutual assured stability: what would the United States need to see happen to have the confidence to consider reductions to very low numbers and, eventually, agree to the elimination of nuclear weapons? Their report, titled "Mutual Assured Stability: Essential Components and Near Term Actions" is posted on our website: [www.state.gov/t/avc](http://www.state.gov/t/avc). It makes for an interesting read. While ISAB reports are not official State documents, their ideas are helpful as we make our own assessments.

### The Indispensability of P5 Leadership

Of course, it is not just the United States and the Russian Federation that must show leadership on these issues. We must be joined by the United Kingdom, France and China. The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty accords these P5 nations special status. They hold among them the overwhelming majority of nuclear weapons in the world, and progress on nuclear disarmament cannot be achieved without their active participation. But they must do more than participate; they must lead collectively. There are certainly more bilateral steps for the U.S. and Russia to take, but there is much the P5 can do to build the foundation for future multilateral steps. The recent P5 Conference in Washington, D.C. is a good example of this.

The Washington conference, in which Anton participated, was a part of a newly-established regular, multilateral dialogue among the P5, which includes discussion of nuclear verification and transparency. The P5 are committed to the implementation of the Action Plan that was adopted by consensus at the 2010 NPT Review Conference. ☺



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## What Others Say

The first constructive step in this direction took place at the Paris conference in June 2011, when the P5 met to discuss transparency, verification, and confidence-building measures – pursuant to the Action Plan – following on the groundbreaking meeting of this new P5 process in London in 2009.

All the P5 states recognize the fundamental importance of transparency in building mutual understanding and confidence. In Paris, we exchanged information on nuclear doctrine and capabilities and discussed possible voluntary transparency and confidence-building measures. We also conferred on the steps we have taken to implement our Article VI commitment, including reporting, a topic of great interest to the NPT community and one for which the P5 acknowledges a special responsibility.

The Washington P5 Conference began on June 27 with a U.S.-hosted public event titled “Three Pillars for Peace and Security: Implementing the NPT.” This forum addressed how each of the three pillars of the NPT – nonproliferation, peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and disarmament – plays a part in the move towards a negotiated, effectively verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons. At the conference, the P5 reaffirmed their unconditional support for the NPT and the NPT Review Conference’s Action Plan, reaffirmed the commitments to promote and ensure the swift entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and its universalization, discouraged abuse of the NPT withdrawal provision (Article X), stressed the need to strengthen International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and promote universalization of the Additional Protocol, and worked to pursue their shared goal of nuclear disarmament under Article VI of the NPT.

The P5 continued their discussion of how to report on their relevant activities, and considered proposals for a standard reporting format. The P5 also discussed ways to kick start negotiations on a verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices that has stalled in the Conference on Disarmament. The P5 agreed on the work plan for a P5 working group led by China, to develop a glossary of definitions for key nuclear terms. We expect this process will increase P5 mutual understanding and facilitate further P5 discussions on nuclear matters.

We regard this year’s Washington P5 Conference as a success, much like its predecessors. It has ushered in an energetic intersessional period. China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States agreed to continue to meet at all appropriate levels on nuclear issues, to further promote dialogue, predictability, and mutual confidence. We plan to hold a fourth P5 conference in the context of the next NPT Preparatory Committee in 2013.

The P5 has also been working with other relevant parties to promote the early commencement of Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament (CD). The FMCT is the next step in multilateral arms control, and it is time to move forward on it. Meeting several times over the past year, key stakeholder countries have discussed the way ahead, and this has already resulted in a more positive and cooperative atmosphere among these countries with regards to FMCT. Currently, I believe it is our very best chance at progress on the issue, and has the best potential to move the CD to action on the Treaty.

## Conclusion

The United States looks forward to continued cooperation with both the Russian Federation and the rest of the P5, as we all work towards nuclear disarmament. We have much to do and many obstacles in our way, but together we can meet these challenges through communication, transparency, diplomacy and plain old persistence: step by step, we will make progress.

In closing, let me return to the Cuban Missile Crisis. We survived those terrifying days of the Cuban Missile Crisis, because our leaders chose reason and diplomacy over fear and brinkmanship. When negotiators from the United States and the Soviet Union first began having bilateral nuclear reduction talks, I am certain that in their minds they carried with them the darkest moments of that crisis. The reality of how close we came to our own destruction – the destruction of the world – must never be forgotten. We must remember why we are here talking today, why our nations meet each other at the negotiating table and why we must show leadership among our allies, partners and friends. □



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## Civil Society Perspective

### How to Disarm Nuclear Warheads

By KATE HUDSON | CND General Secretary



[September 28] Can we actually get rid of nuclear weapons? This is a question I get asked on quite a regular basis at public meetings. And it's a good question that has a simple answer: yes we can. While I am no scientist or engineer, even I can understand how to dismantle a nuclear weapon, thanks to CND's new briefing 'Disarming Trident'.

Following detailed research by John Ainslie from Scottish CND, we have been able to produce this simple step-by-step guide.

You can find the new report here. It sets out to demystify the disarmament process and show how within four years Britain could dismantle its nuclear warheads. Let it not be said that we activists aren't practically-minded!

As I wrote recently for Left Foot Forward, the report [<http://www.cnduk.org/information/briefings/trident-briefings/item/1487-disarming-trident>] is based on the Ministry of Defence's (MoD) practices for operating the Trident nuclear weapons system. "This includes the processes of deploying, removing and storing nuclear warheads used by the Vanguard class submarines, based at HMNB Clyde, as well as a detailed knowledge of the MoD's infrastructure and facilities which service Trident.


When a Scotland-focused version of this report was released in June it was commended by international defence and security experts as proposing a serious and credible timeframe. Over eight phases, each with realistic timeframes, the report explains how Britain's nuclear weapons could be deactivated and then dismantled.

The report also discusses verification measures which could be used to confirm the completion of the phases without compromising sensitive or classified information.

#### Practical steps towards verification measures

Since 2007, Britain and Norway have collaborated on an initiative to explore how a non-nuclear weapons state (NNWS) could verify a state had dismantled its nuclear arsenal. Through several practical exercises, the use of Information Barriers (IBs) was developed. IBs work through agreed boundaries between parties which protect sensitive information/components while enabling enough transparency to ascertain whether or not nuclear weapons are being dismantled.

Here are the phases in brief (though for full details please see the report):



Phase	Action	Timescale (accumulated)
1	End operational deployment from HMNB Clyde	7 days
2	Remove the key and trigger necessary to launch a Trident missile	7 days
3	Deactivate missiles by removing target components	8 days
4	Remove the nuclear warheads from submarines	8 weeks
5	Remove the missiles from submarines	10 weeks
6	Disable the nuclear warheads by removing key components	1 year
7	Transfer the warheads from HMNB Clyde to the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE), Burghfield	2 years
8	Dismantle the warheads at AWE, Burghfield	4 years



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Though this concept is still in development, the framework of this process provides a foundation on which to build confidence in future dismantlement verification techniques.

Clearing the thicket

With so much hyperbole and obfuscation in the nuclear weapons debate, as much clarity and honesty is needed as possible. We hope this report goes some way to showing the clear steps which could be taken to deactivate and dismantle Britain's nuclear weapons - and the rapid time frame in which this could happen. In doing so, we hope to debunk the myth that disarmament is just too much trouble to be worth it.

Even previous supporters of Trident are starting to question spending more than £100 billion on replacing and maintaining it. This is especially acute at a time when conventional defence forces are being axed to pay for Trident, the government's own National Security Strategy downgraded its significance, and senior military figures say it is redundant.

Now more than ever, there should be a clear-headed debate about whether or not maintaining a nuclear weapons system is the right thing to do, and this report makes that a more accessible and intelligible prospect." □

**Cut Trident - not Jobs, Health and Education**  
CND will be pushing home its Cut Trident message this Autumn



<http://www.cnduk.org/about/item/1177>



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### The Sad Legacy of Nuclear Testing

By XANTHE HALL\* | <http://peaceandhealthblog.com>



[September 2, 2012] The city of Astana has something of “Truman’s World.” Everything glitters and shines, is modern, a show world. You get the feeling that people were put here to be seen by us. The most famous architects of the world strut their stuff on every corner. Looking out from the bar on the 25th floor of the Beijing Palace Hotel Astana one is overwhelmed by the panorama of this new, modern Kazakhstan.

Behind it is the steppe. A flat grassland that extends in all directions as far as you can see. In winter it is cold, colder than most of us can imagine. I ask “how cold?” My Kazakh companion smiles and replies: “Don’t ask, it is very cold.” But the sun is shining now, reflected from the many white surfaces and tinted windows of skyscrapers. It dazzles.

Astana is a completely new city, only 15 years old, the new capital of Kazakhstan. It symbolizes the brave new world of President Nazarbayev: successful, a country of smart investments, a business center between East and West, a trading hub. And at the same time he wants to convey that Kazakhstan represents hope, a land of peace and integration, independent and yet open to cooperation of any kind, reliable and trustworthy. He wants to build a nuclear fuel bank here.

I am in Astana for the international conference “From a Nuclear Test Ban to a Nuclear Weapons Free World”, which began on the International Day against Nuclear Tests, August 29th.

Kazakhstan was the first country to abandon nuclear weapons. After the collapse of the Soviet Union Nazarbayev decided that the best thing to do was to scrap the nuclear weapons they had inherited from the Soviet Union, and a year later he also closed the test site at Semipalatinsk. But despite that, the country’s nuclear legacy was far from over. A much worse heritage awaited the people from eastern Kazakhstan, namely the long-term effects of over 450 nuclear tests from 1949 to 1989. To this day the people of Semey (Kazakh for Semipalatinsk) fight with sickness and death. Karipbek Kuyukov works as an ambassador for these radiation victims. He was born without arms.

“I have seen many families who have suffered terribly. I met a mother who had given birth to ten children, all born with birth defects. These children could not play in the street because they were ashamed of their appearance. Their mother told me to ask the world why she had to suffer so. Eight years ago, all the children had already died, the mother and father as well. After that, I promised to myself I would ask her question.”

Kuyukov asks that question now for the “Atom Project” and calls for a ban on nuclear testing. The radiation victims of Semipalatinsk give the project a face. The Nazarbayev center in Astana commissioned an advertising agency to carry out the project that is promoting the entry into force of the nuclear test ban treaty worldwide. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty has not been ratified by enough countries. It can only enter into force when 44 countries, named in Annex 2 of the Treaty, have ratified.

During a break in the meeting of Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (PNND) on August 30, I talked with Savas Hadjikyriacou, a Greek Cypriot, who heads the project. His company does not take any money for the project, he says. His aim is to focus on the “human factor” of the issue in order to win as many signatures for a nuclear test ban as possible. 1.5 million people were affected by the consequences of nuclear testing in Kazakhstan alone. Worldwide, there were probably billions.

I ask him about medical data. He wants to put me in touch with those responsible in Nazarbayev center and is certain they have nothing to hide. “They want the world to understand what is going on here,” he says. We talked about a possible IPPNW delegation to Semey to meet doctors there and learn more about the radiation effects. He wants to help facilitate this. ☺

\*Xanthe Hall is the nuclear disarmament expert for IPPNW Germany. This article is a translation of a piece first published in German on the German IPPNW blog.



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What becomes clear here in Kazakhstan is the meaning of the word “ecocide” – the destruction of the environment on a large-scale. Polly Higgins, a Scottish lawyer, attended the parliamentary assembly and told us about the crime of ecocide. “A law against the crime of ecocide would give teeth to the abolition of nuclear weapons,” she said. She is advocating that the International Criminal Court recognise ecocide as one of the list of crimes against peace and humanity. Ten countries have already criminalized ecocide. Polly tells me she is coming to Berlin in October. I offer to put her in touch with people and organize a round table.

Now, after our last meeting, I’ll fly home. I’m packing many impressions and, most of all, work in my bag. I have a feeling that I will come back to Kazakhstan, to learn more and understand it better. This country offers a lot more than just a brave new world. Beneath the surface there is an ancient land that has been exploited and destroyed, full of different cultures and histories. Truly the center of our world, between worlds. Kazakhstan is at the heart of future peace. ☐

## Think Big: Making Peace with the Cookie Monster

By XANTHE HALL | IPPNW Germany | <http://peaceandhealthblog.com>

It is not often that we have opportunity to laugh at Benjamin Netanyahu’s rhetoric about Iran and what the consequences may be, but his show at the UN on September 27 really took the biscuit (or the cookie, Mr. Fish might say). Holding up a large cartoon bomb, Bibi explained to us where exactly that “red line” should be that he has been demanding Barack Obama define.

Interestingly enough, Bibi is actually giving Iran more time by putting the red line between enrichment to 20% and enrichment to 90%. But that is as may be, since – by his own admission – we might not actually know even if they did start enriching to 90%. If Israeli suspicions played out, Iran would have to do such a thing so secretly, under some remote mountain somewhere, that the IAEA couldn’t even smell it happening. And, rest assured, the IAEA sniffer dogs are in Iran all of the time monitoring their uranium enrichment activities.

Note that Bibi says that not even his own beloved Mossad is foolproof in their estimation of what Iran is doing. The intelligence services seem to agree that there is no immediate threat. And he didn’t even mention the fact that IAEA inspectors are constantly checking that the cascades of centrifuges are sticking to the agreed levels of enrichment and, more importantly, Iran is letting them in to do that. If you read the IAEA reports, as I have but I suspect Netanyahu hasn’t, then you will find that, so far, everything Iran has declared about its enrichment has been verified. The row is about what they might not have declared. And this row could go on forever, since whatever is undeclared cannot be verified. It is simply impossible to verify 100% that a civilian nuclear programme is not clandestinely being used for military purposes – hence my belief that nuclear energy is too dangerous to be allowed, quite apart from all the health and environmental dangers involved.

There are, of course, concerns about how far Iran got with its alleged “military dimensions” before 2003 and how much of that work could suddenly become relevant if the decision to go nuclear was actually taken. So maybe we should be trying to find out where Iran’s red line has been drawn, at which point they would feel the need to actually build a nuclear bomb, rather than just have the option of doing so (which, by the way, many other countries in the world share).

It seems to me that we will not solve the immediate conflict over Iran’s nuclear programme without addressing the underlying conflict. The Arabic countries and Iran drew a clear red line for the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1995 and again in 2010, when they made it clear that any possession of nuclear weapons in the region should no longer be tolerated. Specifically, Israel should become a member of the NPT as a non-nuclear weapons state and adhere to IAEA safeguards, like all the other countries of the region are presently. A treaty on a zone free of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is regarded by these countries as a condition of maintaining the non-proliferation regime – I presume that includes IAEA safeguards – as we know it. Without the NPT, we would all be up the proverbial creek without a barrel. ☞



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Israel has consistently said that there is no point in even discussing a WMD free zone while there is no peace or stability in the region. From the point of view of the logic behind their possession of nuclear weapons, this makes sense. Israel uses ambiguity about its nuclear weapons to deter conventional or WMD attack. At the same time it represents a Catch 22 because there will be no peace and stability in the region until those nuclear weapons have gone.

What is actually necessary, in my opinion, is a parallel process to negotiations on a WMD free zone. With that I mean we should be considering a comprehensive package: i.e. talks on confidence-building and common security for all the states of the region – not simply a peace process on the Israeli/Palestinian conflict but including it – at the same time as negotiations on a zone. It could be a long-term conference on how to build confidence and cooperation in the region, perhaps loosely modelled on the CSCE during the Cold War, and including recognition of Israel as a legitimate state, as well as confidence building and transparency measures on military forces and activities. Access to Parchin might, for instance, be one of these, or even Dimona.

This is the basic idea behind the IPPNW project on a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Middle East (CSCME) which attempts to bring together civil society representatives to enact such a process on a civil society level and discuss how to get it established on a government level. We found out at the first meeting, for example, that how the region is seen, defined and named (Middle East versus West Asia) also contributes to the search for common ground and respectful recognition of differences. Such meetings show the value of civil society conducting dialogue and leading the way for governments to follow.

Themes that might need to be covered by a CSCME are, for instance, commitments not to attack the others' nuclear installations, the recognition of the right to a state of both Israel and Palestine, negative and positive security guarantees, borders would need to be addressed and any threatening, inflammatory statements renounced. Whereas negotiations on a zone would need to include such items as the right of Iran to enrich uranium, the obligation of all countries of the region to put all nuclear installations under safeguards – including Israel – to abide by Safeguards Agreements with the IAEA already made – including Iran – and to strengthen them through signing and adhering to the Additional Protocol, transparency on stockpiles of fissile materials and the establishment of verification mechanisms. This list is by no means exhaustive. In both processes, there needs to be painful attention to symmetry, both real and perceived.

We criticise the current step-by-step approach applied to nuclear disarmament because we see the need for a disarmament process that is less dependent on each single step and more on a clear connection between agreed measures so as to make them mutually reinforcing. Our eyes have to remain on the final objective all the way through the process and it should not be possible to stop with the job half done and cement an advantageous position for any one grouping. This same applies to the Middle East where all parties are nervous that each step might put them at a disadvantage. Conducting parallel negotiations that reinforce each other can overcome this insecurity. Just getting the countries around the table in Helsinki might be regarded by many as a major breakthrough. But unless we think much bigger and more comprehensively on this issue we will continue to perform the partner line dance (one step forward, two steps back). That will not lead us to world peace, but ultimately back to the stone age via nuclear war. □

Visit [www.nuclearabolition.net](http://www.nuclearabolition.net)

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