



# BEYOND NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION

## NEWSLETTER FOR STRENGTHENING AWARENESS OF NUCLEAR ABOLITION WITH NOVEMBER 2012 ARTICLES

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### In-Depth Reports

#### **Stable Nuke Zero is Feasible**



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That was back in July 1955. Since then, major atomic powers have looked at nuclear deterrence as guarantor of enduring world peace and security. It was not before April 2009 – a few months before being announced the winner of Nobel Peace Prize – that President Barack Obama in his historic speech in Prague called for “a world without nuclear weapons”.

But in the fall of 2009, another Nobel laureate, Thomas Schelling, vehemently questioned the desirability of a world without nuclear weapons. In an essay – titled ‘A world without nuclear weapons?’ – in *Dædalus*, founded in 1955 as the Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Schelling challenged the wisdom of going to “zero” and asked what would happen in the event of another war. > Pages 2-4

#### **Amidst Turmoil, Nuke-Free Mideast Conference Derailed**



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But Dr. Rebecca Johnson, director of the Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy, told IPS it is appalling for the people of the Middle East that militarism is still destroying the lives of civilians.

“If the recent tragic developments have also derailed the important Conference on freeing the Middle East of weapons of mass destruction, it will be important to convene early in 2013,” she said. > Pages 4-6

#### **NATO Pushing Europe into New Nuclear Arms Race**



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### Stable Nuke Zero is Feasible

By RAMESH JAURA



BERLIN | VIENNA (IDN) - Before World War II broke out in 1939, German-born Nobel laureate Albert Einstein recommended President Franklin D. Roosevelt to begin research on a nuclear weapon since Germany under Adolf Hitler might be developing such a destructive tool. The result was the Manhattan Project, which culminated in the U.S. dropping atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Einstein deplored use of the new discovery of nuclear fission as a weapon, and signed with the British philosopher Bertrand Russell, the Russell-Einstein Manifesto, highlighting the danger of nukes.

That was back in July 1955. Since then, major atomic powers have looked at nuclear deterrence as guarantor of enduring world peace and security. It was not before April 2009 – a few months before being announced the winner of Nobel Peace Prize – that President Barack Obama in his historic speech in Prague called for “a world without nuclear weapons”.

But in the fall of 2009, another Nobel laureate, Thomas Schelling, vehemently questioned the desirability of a world without nuclear weapons. In an essay – titled ‘A world without nuclear weapons?’ – in *Dædalus*, founded in 1955 as the Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Schelling challenged the wisdom of going to “zero” and asked what would happen in the event of another war.

Schelling’s essay would appear to have stimulated the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation (VCDNP) to organise an international seminar and a panel discussion on November 19 and 20 to find answers to the question ‘Stable Zero: Feasible, Realistic?’ that is crucial for the survival of Planet Earth and humankind.

The event was organised in cooperation with the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) – Norway’s leading independent centre for research and information on international political and economic issues as well as on areas of central relevance to Norwegian foreign policy – and the Toda Institute for Global Peace and Policy Research, named after Josei Toda (1900-1958).

Toda was a Japanese educator and philosopher who was imprisoned together with his mentor Tsunesaburo Makiguchi (1871-1944) for upholding the belief in the dignity of life despite persecution by the Japanese military government during World War II. Makiguchi died in prison but Toda was able to survive the ordeal, devoting the rest of his life to the development of a grassroots peace movement in post-war Japan.

The Institute was established in 1996 by Toda’s main disciple Daisaku Ikeda, the President of the Soka Gakkai International (SGI), a worldwide movement for peace, culture and education based on Buddhist Humanism.

Describing the purpose of the seminar, VCDNP, which is backed by the Austrian Foreign Ministry and James Martin Center of Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) at the Monterey Institute of International Studies as its partner, said: One might hope that major war would not happen in a world without nuclear weapons, but it always did, and Schelling worries that the necessary scenario analyses to find the strengths and weaknesses of proposals for a nuclear weapon-free world have not been done.

“Considering how much intellectual effort in the past half-century went into the study of the ‘stability’ of a nuclear deterrence world, it ought to be worthwhile to examine contingencies in a nuclear-free world to verify that it is superior to a world with (some) nuclear weapons,” VCDNP said quoting Schelling. It added: This taps into the question of the meaning of “zero” – reconstitution capabilities; going more or less below “zero” – and in this respect a variety of views have been expressed. Schelling, on his part, emphasizes that a world without any reconstitution capability is illusory. ☺

Image: U.S. Trident II (D-5) missile underwater launch | Credit: Wikimedia Commons



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Panelists included besides Schelling, a distinguished University Professor Emeritus in the School of Public Policy at the University of Maryland, who was awarded the 2005 Nobel Prize in Economics; former Swedish Ambassador Rolf Ekeus, Chairman Emeritus of Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and a board member of Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI); Sverre Lodgaard, Senior Research Fellow of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs; and Andreas Persbo, Executive Director of the London-based Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC).

‘A nervous world’?

Schelling’s argue: “A world without nuclear weapons would be a world in which the United States, Russia, Israel, China, and half a dozen or a dozen other countries would have hair-trigger mobilization plans to rebuild nuclear weapons and mobilize or commandeer delivery systems, and would have prepared targets to preempt other nations’ nuclear facilities, all in a high-alert status, with practice drills and secure emergency communications. Every crisis would be a nuclear crisis, any war could become a nuclear war. The urge to preempt would dominate; whoever gets the first few weapons will coerce or preempt. It would be a nervous world.”

Such arguments do not detract Ekeus or Lodgaard from pleading the cause of a world without nuclear weapons – a world that would usher in only if the five permanent members of the UN Security Council do not insist on their “divine right” to develop, produce and stockpile nuclear weapons, while denying half a dozen or a dozen other countries such a right in the name of non-proliferation.

The Federation of American Scientists estimates there are more than 19,000 nuclear warheads in the world as of 2012, with around 4,400 of them kept in “operational” status, ready for use. There is no denying the fact, therefore, that transforming today’s heavily nuke-armed world into a world without nuclear weapons is not an easy task.

And this particularly against the backdrop, as VERTIC’s Executive Director Persbo, points out: “. . . we do not really know what conditions will enable a world free of nuclear weapons. Will it, as some argue, require a fundamental transformation of world affairs? Do we, as others say, need to live in a world with considerably reduced international tension, and a massive reduction in conventional arms, before we can consider giving up nuclear explosives?”

Persbo adds: “We do not have any good answers to these questions. As we do not, almost every answers assumes almost equal weight. The arguments becomes articles of faith, not carried by empirical evidence. You either believe in deterrence, that nuclear weapons preserved world peace, or you do not. Neither advocate can disprove the other.”

Safeguards

With this in view, Persbo rightly stresses the role of safeguards in the future. “Safeguards, as administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency, will become increasingly important in a nuclear weapon free world. Fissile material will need to be accounted for, and the absence of undeclared stockpiles of these materials would need to be confirmed.”

He explains: “I think that verification in a nuclear weapon-free world will look very similar to safeguards in non-nuclear weapon states, but on a much larger scale. The fuel cycles of the two largest nuclear weapon states, the United States and Russia, are fundamentally different, and much larger, than cycles found elsewhere. It will be challenging to take them on, and to bring them under full-scope safeguards. There are some large uncertainties in the stockpile numbers, and it may take decades, many decades, before anything resembling a completeness determination can be drawn.”

But Persbo thinks that these challenges can be overcome. “Putting some political capital into the negotiation of an FMCT will be a good start. Empowering the IAEA secretariat to be able to address some of the technical tasks that await them is a step that can be taken today. The IAEA already has a reasonably completed technical protocol for material disposition, but need to start to prepare for future verification challenges as well. And let me be clear. I believe that this task belongs with the Agency. Perhaps not the Agency as we know it today, but a stronger, more powerful version of the body.” ☺



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In fact, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) also plays an important role in bringing about a nuke-free world. The Treaty has a unique and comprehensive verification regime to make sure that no nuclear explosion goes undetected. The International Monitoring System (IMS) will, when complete, consist of 337 facilities worldwide to monitor the planet for signs of nuclear explosions. Over 85 percent of the facilities are already up and running.

The importance of such verification regimes cannot be underrated. But political will to do away with nuclear weapons, which are weapons of mass destruction, whoever might use these, is of utmost importance.

For this reason, SGI and the Toda Institute are wedded to the cause of abolishing nuclear weapons. In fact, back in September 1957, Josei Toda made a declaration against nuclear weapons in Yokohama. He said that the willingness to use these weapons was an expression of the devilish nature lurking within human beings, leading them to control and dominate others through fear and threats rather than choosing dialogue and collaboration. Based on Toda's declaration, SGI President Ikeda has been outlining his vision for a peaceful global civilization in numerous proposals.

In one of his latest 'peace proposals,' titled 'Human Security and Sustainability: Sharing Reverence for the Dignity of Life,' Ikeda pleads for a nuclear abolition summit in 2015 in Hiroshima and Nagasaki on the 70th anniversary of the atomic bombings of the two cities so that the growing momentum toward elimination of nuclear weapons becomes irreversible.

2015 will also be the year of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference, and, like people around the world, Ikeda expects such a summit to bring home to world leaders the terrible destructive capacity of nuclear weapons and so help ensure the necessary action toward their abolition. [IDN-InDepthNews – November 29, 2012] ☑

## Amidst Turmoil, Nuke-Free Mideast Conference Derailed

By THALIF DEEN



UNITED NATIONS (IPS) - A long outstanding international conference on a nuclear weapons-free zone in the Middle East, scheduled to take place in Finland next month, has been postponed, giving rise to speculation on whether it will ever get off the ground.

U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, a vigorous opponent of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), remains hopeful the conference will take place sometime next year.

"I have also personally engaged with the states of the region at the highest level to underline the importance of the conference in promoting long-term regional stability, peace and security on the basis of equality," he said.

But Dr. Rebecca Johnson, director of the Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy, told IPS it is appalling for the people of the Middle East that militarism is still destroying the lives of civilians.

"If the recent tragic developments have also derailed the important Conference on freeing the Middle East of weapons of mass destruction, it will be important to convene early in 2013," she said.

Dr. Johnson said the date need not be a deal-breaker – but this delay makes it even more important now to start a determined and constructive process to eliminate nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) from the region. ☞

Picture above: Ruins of the Abu Khadra complex for civil administration following an Israeli airstrike on Gaza City. Credit: Mohammed Omer | IPS



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“If the meeting cannot launch an effective process early in 2013, there will be serious consequences not only for the region but for the credibility of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), demonstrating yet another failure to deliver on its essential agreements,” she warned.

The proposal for the meeting was endorsed by 189 member states at the Review Conference on the NPT held at the United Nations in May 2010.

The Israeli government, while criticising the outcome document of that Review Conference, left the door open for participation in the proposed conference.

But the political uprisings in the Arab world, including the ouster of the Israeli-friendly Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, have triggered expressions of Israeli concern – specifically its own security in an increasingly hostile environment.

In a statement released Monday, the secretary-general said he reaffirms his “firm resolve and commitment, together with the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, in consultation with the states of the region, to convene a conference to be attended by all states of the Middle East.”

The focus, he said, will be on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by the states of the region.

Hillel Schenker, co-editor of the Palestine-Israel Journal, told IPS that while it’s unfortunate the Helsinki conference will not be convened in 2012, the fact that Ban Ki-moon and the co-conveners, the U.S., UK and Russia, remain committed to the process is very encouraging.

It’s understandable, given the circumstances, he said, that it was difficult to convene the conference in December 2012.

However, the recent statement by the secretary-general expressing hope that the Finnish facilitator will be able “to conduct multilateral consultations in the shortest possible time which will allow the conference to be convened in the earliest possible time in 2013”, means that this valuable process will continue.

“For the conference to succeed, it is crucial that both Iran and Israel be at the table,” Schenker noted. “Hopefully the facilitator, perhaps with the aid of the Americans, will be able to convince the Israeli government of the importance of engaging in this process.”

Still, he said, the Helsinki Conference remains an historic opportunity to move forward on a parallel track, towards the creation of a regional security regime which will contain a Nuclear and WMD-Free Zone and towards Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Arab comprehensive peace.

Meanwhile, the United States which traditionally throws a protective arm around Israel, has already laid down a condition in advance of the pre-conference preparations.

In July 2010, when Israeli President Benjamin Netanyahu met with U.S. President Barack Obama, he was assured the Middle East conference would not single out Israel.

A White House statement also insisted the conference would only take place “if all countries feel confident they can attend, and that any efforts to single out Israel will make the prospects of convening such a conference unlikely.”

Speaking at a symposium on “Faith, Dialogue and Integration” at the United Nations Monday, Jonathan Granoff, president of the Global Security Institute, said nuclear weapons represent a form of security apartheid.

Like apartheid, both sides are injured. And those threatened reasonably feel the terror of destruction, he added, pointing out that those threatening have their moral foundations corroded or live in denial of what they are doing. ➔



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“The continued reliance on these horrific devices provides the modern world with its most severe and divisive irony,” he said.

The means of pursuing security are serving to breed insecurity. And the inequity inherent in the system pulls at the fabric of human unity, he added.

As Vartan Gregorian of the Carnegie Corporation recently pointed out, “All declared nuclear powers – the U.S., Russia, Great Britain, France, and China and now India and Pakistan (Israel as an undeclared nuclear power) – insist they possess nuclear weapons only to deter others from using them.”

Yet there have been many times in the past, and there will surely be times in the future, when major powers have used their nuclear capability to gain some political end by intimidation, he said.

Intimidation through the threat of annihilation of millions of innocent people is unjustified legally, morally, and remains the greatest threat to the stimulation of the proliferation of weapons, said Granoff. Thus, continued threat to use these weapons is impractical.

“One must therefore wonder if the irrational pride of power informs the policies of those who seek to perpetuate and ‘improve’ their arsenals of devastation,” he said. [IPS | November 28, 2012] ☑

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## NATO Pushing Europe into New Nuclear Arms Race

By JULIO GODOY



BERLIN (IDN) - Between late 2009 and mid-2010, the German government, represented by its foreign minister Guido Westerwelle, made a case for dismantling B61 atomic bombs on German soil. The actual number of such weapons of mass destruction is a top military secret, but some 20 of these are reported to be stationed in Germany.

The German campaign for nuclear disarmament had relevance also for Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands – as well as Turkey – where the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is stated to have positioned between 150 and 200 nuclear weapons.

Like his predecessor Frank Walter Steinmeier, Westerwelle made the arguments of the anti-nuclear weapons activists his own, and recalled that such arsenal is in many ways obsolete, for it was conceived to be used in conjunction with other armament that itself is out of use, and it aimed at an enemy – the Soviet bloc – that had ceased to exist.

The German campaign, as discreet as it was, was a timely reaction to the historic speech the U.S. president Barack Obama made in the Czech capital Prague in April 2009, where he called the nuclear weapons spread across the world “the most dangerous legacy of the Cold War”.

But soon, the German campaign for the denuclearisation of Europe, very much like Obama’s speech in Prague, turned out to be no more than pious words. Already in April 2010, NATO had approved the so-called modernization of its nuclear arsenal in Europe, which should be completed by 2020. The modernisation was confirmed in May 2012 at the Chicago summit, during the so called deterrence and defence posture review (DDPR).

By so doing, NATO finally admits that the criticism of the present nuclear arsenal is correct – it is constituted of so-called dumb weapons, for they are to be dropped from war planes over target zones, and be guided by a radar that, according to U.S. senate hearings, was constructed in the 1960s and originally designed for “a five-year lifetime”. ☞

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Picture: B61 training unit accurately replicates the shape and size of a "live" B61 | Credit: Wikimedia Commons



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This radar also features “the now infamous vacuum tubes”, as one U.S. military industry representative stated at the senate hearing, and “must be replaced. In addition, both the neutron generator and a battery component are fast approaching obsolescence and must be replaced.”

Dropping such dumb nuclear weapons from an airplane would mean that, in case they operate as expected, vast areas would be obliterated from the face of the earth.

The old B61 nuclear bombs manifest several dangers: In 2005, a U.S. Air Force review discovered that procedures used during maintenance of the nuclear weapons in Europe held a risk that a lightning strike could trigger a nuclear detonation. In 2008, yet another U.S. Air Force review concluded that “most” nuclear weapons locations in Europe did not meet U.S. security guidelines and would “require significant additional resources” to bring these up to standard.

The modernisation of this archaic arsenal is expected to take place in two phases. In a first step, the B61 bombs currently deployed in Europe will be returned to the United States starting 2016 and converted into precision guided nuclear weapons (the so called B61-life extension programme or B61 LEP) and then brought back to Europe as B61-12, with improved military capabilities around 2019/2020. In addition, a new stealth fighter-bomber – the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter – is under construction to begin deployment to Europe in the early 2020s.

However, this modernisation contradicts NATO’s assessment of the present arsenal, and undermines other declared objectives of the military alliance.

Absurd

First, in its DDPR of May 2012, NATO affirms that “the Alliance’s nuclear force posture currently meets the criteria for an effective deterrence and defence posture”. As numerous critics of NATO’s nuclear arsenal point out, if this arsenal is so efficient, why then is it necessary to improve its capabilities? This is all the more absurd, since the B61-LE “is very expensive, currently more than 10 billion U.S. dollars,” as Hans M. Kristensen, director of the Nuclear Information Project with the Federation of American Scientists, said November 7, 2012 during a hearing at the Disarmament and Foreign Affairs Committee of the German Parliament in Berlin.

This high cost, Kristensen added, “Is partly said to be necessary to upgrade safety and security features of the bomb. It is a mystery why that is necessary given that the (nuclear) weapons in Europe are always said to be safe and secure.”

But the contradictions go beyond the mere nature of the assessment and the technical obsolescence of the nuclear armament. Its modernisation also constitutes a challenge to Russia. For, if the NATO description of the new B61 weapons is to be believed, they would be laser-controlled, thus substantially increasing its precision, and be practically able to hit targets within an error margin of less than 30 meters.

Or, as Kristensen puts it, “The addition of the guided tail kit will increase the accuracy of the B61-12 compared with the current versions and result in a greater target kill capability than the B61 versions currently deployed in Europe.” It is worth to note that the U.S. Congress in 1992 rejected a similar guided bomb proposal out of the concern that it would make nuclear weapons appear more useable.

Such precision would transform the B61 nuclear bombs into a rather flexible arsenal, deployable both as a tactical and as a strategic weapon, and no longer only under the present archaic conditions. “Such a change would revive the worst apprehensions the (post-)Soviet leadership had during the Pershing-II debate” of the late 1970s, early 1980s, warns the German nuclear weapons expert Otfried Nassauer, director of the Berlin information centre for transatlantic security (BITS), and co-author of a recent study on the B61-LEP.

That way, Europe would be heading towards a repetition of the ill-reputed “NATO double-track decision” of December 1979. With this decision, the NATO announced the deployment across Western Europe of 572 mobile middle range missiles, of the types Pershing II and BGM-109 Tomahawk Gryphon Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles, to counter the Soviet deployment of SS-20 mobile missiles in Eastern Europe. The result was a most feared nuclear arms race in the heart of Europe, to rebuild the Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), which threatened to annihilate life on the continent.

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Officially, NATO nuclear weapons in Europe are aimed at targets in the Middle East, especially against Iran. Russia, so NATO's official line, has no reasons to fear the modernisation of the B61 weapons. However, such a view is at best naïve, at worst cynical. For everybody in the NATO knows how the Russian leadership reacts to such modernisation plans.

Though the Soviet Union never disclosed how large its tactical nuclear arsenal was, experts believe that Russia today still has between 500 and 700 nuclear weapons mostly aimed at targets in Western Europe. This horrendous mass of nuclear weapons is as antiquated as the NATO's; and the obsolescence and the threat of a modern nuclear arsenal in the hands of a likely enemy, are reasons enough to foresee how the Russian government would react – by modernising its own arsenal.

### “Nuclear sharing policy”

On the other hand, the European opposition to the B61-LEP is almost non-existent. In Germany, despite all the words the foreign ministry used to campaign for nuclear disarmament, the official government programme of 2009, valid today, explicitly adhered to NATO's so called “nuclear sharing policy”, which lets European member countries without nuclear weapons of their own participate in the planning for the use of the B61 stationed on their territories.

As German chancellor Angela Merkel said in March 2009, the German government “should be careful and avoid mixing up the goals with the ways leading to them. The German government has fixed the nuclear sharing policy ... to secure our influence within NATO in this highly sensitive area”.

Similar positions prevail in the other European NATO countries affected by the “nuclear sharing policy”. According to Roderich Kiesewetter, military expert at the ruling CDU party, “the small European countries consider the deployment of nuclear weapons on their territory as a political appreciation of their own position. The Turkish government has even made clear that it would readily take the B61 positioned in Germany, if we were to reject them.”

Other countries, such as Belgium and Netherlands, have also announced that they would upgrade their aircraft military capabilities, to make them compatible with the new B61 nuclear weapons. To that effect, they would command the new F-35 Joint Strike Fighter airplane, to replace their F-16 and B-16 military airplanes which are unable to transport nuclear bombs. Germany still refuses to replace the similarly old Tornado planes, in the pitiful hope, as the military analyst Jochen Bittner put it in the weekly newspaper Die Zeit, “that the nuclear weapons disappear faster than the military airplanes corrode”.

Like Germany, Italy also uses Tornado aircrafts, and Turkey F-16 airplanes to transport the nuclear arsenal. That is, the five European countries disposing of nuclear weapons use three different types of aircraft to transport them. As Kristensen puts it, “Adding B61-12 capability to five different types of aircraft (the U.S. military uses yet another different airplane) in six Air Forces is excessive, complex and expensive for the type of security challenges that face NATO today. More importantly, it demonstrates that the nuclear posture is patched together by leftover pieces from an outdated posture rather than reduced, streamlined and adapted to the military and fiscal realities of today.”

Despite all these technical, military, and political obstacles, German government military expert Kiesewetter argues that the NATO would reconsider the B61 LEP only if Russia were ready to disclose the dimensions and locations of its huge tactical nuclear arsenal. However, he also points out that, even in case of such a dialogue, the modernisation of the European nuclear weapons must go on. “Political weapons must be technical functional,” he said, implicitly admitting the obsolescence of the present arsenal.

Kiesewetter's stance chimes with NATO's official attitude towards Russia. In the DDRP of May 2012, NATO said that in a bi-polar arms control policy “any further steps must take into account the disparity with the greater Russian stockpiles of short-range nuclear weapons,” and be considered “in the context of reciprocal steps by Russia.” ☞

Picture: Hiroshima Peace Memorial reminds of annihilation that nukes cause | Credit: UNESCO



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In other words, says Kristensen, of the Nuclear Information Project, "Given that Russia's non-strategic nuclear posture is not determined by NATO's nuclear posture in Europe but by inferior conventional forces, making further NATO reductions conditioned upon Russian reciprocity and disparity would appear to effectively surrender the arms control initiative to the hardliners in the Kremlin."

In this context, there is hardly any likelihood that Europe in the near future will achieve the "nuclear global zero", that is, the de-alerting and elimination of all tactical nuclear weapons. Much to the despair of anti-nuclear activists and experts alike. As Otfried Nassauer puts it, "Germany has always said that it takes part of the NATO nuclear sharing policy to be able to co-decide." It seems that this was a part of the sham existence of the B61 arsenal in Europe – extremely dangerous, obsolete, and counterproductive. [IDN-InDepthNews – November 21, 2012] ☑

### Read in Japanese

[http://www.nuclearabolition.net/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=786:nato-pushing-europe-into-new-nuclear-arms-race-japanese-&catid=2:japanese-korean&Itemid=3](http://www.nuclearabolition.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=786:nato-pushing-europe-into-new-nuclear-arms-race-japanese-&catid=2:japanese-korean&Itemid=3)

## 欧州を新たな核軍拡に引き込むNATO

【ベルリンIDN=ジュリオ・ゴドイ】

2009年末から2010年半ばにかけて、ギド・ヴェスターヴェレ外相が代表するドイツ政府は、核爆弾「B61」をドイツ領から撤去するよう主張していた。この大量破壊兵器が実際にどれだけ配備されているかは軍の極秘事項であるが、約20発がドイツ領内に配備されていると考えられている。

核軍縮を求めるドイツの訴えは、北大西洋条約機構（NATO）が150～200発の核兵器を配備しているとされるベルギー、イタリア、オランダ、トルコにとっても関連のあるものであった。

前任者のフランク-ヴァ

ルター・シュタインマイヤー氏と同じく、ヴェスターヴェレ外相は、自ら反核活動家と同じような議論を展開し、そうした兵器は多くの面で時代遅れだと主張した。

なぜなら、これらの核兵器は、それ自体使用価値がなくなったと考えられる他の兵器とともに、既に存在しないソ連圏という敵に対して使うことが想定されているからである。

このドイツの運動は控えめなものに見えるが、世界中に広がる核兵器は「冷戦の最も危険な遺産」だとした2009年4月のバラク・オバマ大統領の歴史的なプラハ演説に敏感に反応したものだ。

しかしそれからほどなくして、欧州の非核化を目指すドイツの動きは、オバマ大統領のプラハ演説と同じように、実現の見込みの薄い言葉以上のもではなくなってしまった。すでに2010年4月、NATOは、欧州核兵器のいわゆる近代化計画を承認し、2020年までに完了するものとした。同計画は、2012年5月のNATOシカゴ・サミットでも、いわゆる「抑止・防衛態勢見直し」（DDPR）の中で再確認された。

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# BEYOND NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION

NEWSLETTER FOR STRENGTHENING AWARENESS OF NUCLEAR ABOLITION WITH NOVEMBER 2012 ARTICLES

## What Others Say

### Nuclear and Chem-Bio Weapons Prohibition

By FREDERICK N. MATTIS\*



ANNAPOLIS, USA (IDN) - A gathering theme in world affairs is the desirability of a treaty [convention] to ban nuclear weapons. Such a treaty would bring the following benefits to all states and people: freedom from nuclear war or nuclear attack, freedom from possible “false-alarm” nuclear missile launch, and freedom from possible acquisition by terrorists of a nuclear weapon from a state’s arsenal.

The extant (1968) nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is not the vehicle for such a ban, in part because the NPT does not prohibit nuclear weapons to NPT states-parties that tested a nuclear weapon (or “explosive device”) before January 1, 1967.

Those states are, in order of their first test explosion, the USA, Russia, Britain, France, and China. Three states – Israel, India, Pakistan – have never signed the NPT, and North Korea dropped out in 2003. A premise of this article is that all countries would have to join a new, worldwide nuclear ban treaty before its entry into force.

#### Encompassing Chem-Bio Weapons in a Nuclear Ban

It is here proposed that states, before signing a nuclear ban treaty (often called a Nuclear Weapons Convention), be required by its terms to be full parties to the current chem-bio weapons bans – the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). At present, only five to eight states are generally deemed as probable possessors of chemical and/or biological arsenals, with this excluding CWC parties (USA, Russia, Libya) that are still liquidating their chemical stocks. Envisioning, then, a world on the cusp of banning nuclear weapons, such a world almost certainly would also be geared to renunciation of much-reviled chemical and biological weapons.

If, instead, formal renunciation of chem-bio weapons is not a requirement for states before signing a nuclear ban treaty, then one can easily imagine voices in the USA (for example) saying: “Hold on. We formally renounced chem-bio weapons years ago, and now we’re being asked to eliminate our nuclear weapons while some states are still refusing to join the CWC, BWC, or both. We will not renounce nuclear weapons [along with all other states] if any states fail to also renounce abhorrent chem-bio weapons by joining the CWC and BWC... What are those states hiding?” This mode of thinking likely would “carry the day” in some of today’s nuclear weapon states – even though nuclear weapons are more widely, reliably, and variously (blast, heat, radiation, firestorm) destructive and lethal than chemical or biological.

The Chemical Weapons Convention does have groundbreaking inspection/verification elements, many of which would be adapted and utilized in a worldwide nuclear ban. The Biological Weapons Convention, however, has no verification system; and even if BWC verification is adopted in the future, it is widely predicted to be less effective than nuclear and even chemical inspection. But, assuming that in the future there is still no BWC inspection, the unanimity of states’ accession to the CWC and BWC (before nuclear ban entry into force) would lend the chem-bio prohibitions unprecedented geopolitical force. It would also likely reduce, although not eliminate, the potential terrorist chem-bio threat for three reasons.

First, the normative influence and legal strictures of the CWC and BWC would reduce the variety, quantity, and dispersal of chem-bio-usable agents within states, thereby diminishing terrorists’ chances of illicit access – and there would be no fully weaponized agents possibly to be accessed. Second, if there are states that do “harbor” terrorists, then those states may be less likely to do so if they believe such terrorists might pursue chemical or biological weapons, because castigation of and opposition to such a harboring state would be severe, if the terrorists actually conducted a significant attack with unanimously-banned chemical or biological weapons. Third, it is possible that even some terrorists may develop qualms about pursuing chem-bio weapons in a world wherein all states have formally abjured those instruments through joining the CWC and BWC (before signing the nuclear ban). ☺

Photo: Soldiers wearing chem. suits participate in the toxic industrial chemical protection and detection equipment training at Fort Hood, Texas. Credit: army.mil | Jasmine Morales



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### Objection and Response

The salient objection to required CWC/BWC accession before a state signs the nuclear ban hinges on the fact that today's (mere) several or so states that presumably do maintain some level of active chemical and/or biological weapons programs would have to officially renounce chem-bio weapons before the current nuclear states renounce nuclear weapons (upon entry into force of a unanimously joined nuclear ban treaty). Would today's chem-bio possessors do so? Extreme skeptics would argue No, they would not join the CWC and BWC, because if they did then for an indeterminate time they would no longer have their chemical and/or biological weapons while their nuclear-armed neighbors/rivals still have nukes – until entry into force and full enactment of a worldwide nuclear weapons ban.

But, to the contrary, in all likelihood chem-bio possessors would join the CWC and BWC before signing the nuclear ban; and ironically, for the same reason they are widely understood to be chem-bio possessors – the threat or perceived threat posed by nuclear weapons of another state or states. With the actual introduction for states' signatures of a nuclear ban treaty, the incentive of prospective freedom from the supreme threat – nuclear – would powerfully induce today's CWC/BWC non-signatories to join the CWC and BWC, and then the nuclear ban. In addition, the states in question would, and predictably to them, be praised and likely reap some tangential but real benefits from joining the chem-bio bans.

A non-nuclear weapon state such as Egypt might aver, though, that nuclear possessor Israel first should join a [prospective] nuclear ban – before Egypt officially renounces its (here-presumed) chemical weapons by joining the CWC. This in itself should pose no realistic problem for Israel because under specific nuclear ban entry-into-force terms, Israel and today's other nuclear weapon possessors would have no nuclear ban obligations whatsoever (such to declare and progressively eliminate their arsenals) until Egypt and all states have officially renounced chem-bio weapons by joining the CWC and BWC, and then have joined the nuclear ban. Meanwhile, though, today's widely-signed nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty would still be in effect. (Israel, incidentally, is not a full party to the CWC or BWC; but nuclear-armed Israel, like all states, would have to be a full party to the CWC and BWC before signing the nuclear ban.)

### Summary

Worldwide prohibition of chem-bio weapons is important, and would be especially so to nuclear weapon possessors such as the USA (and Israel) in their contemplation of possible accession to a worldwide nuclear ban treaty. It is likely that some at least of the current nuclear states would not sign such a ban, and it would not enter into force, unless all states renounce chem-bio arsenals by joining the CWC and BWC; and therefore it is recommended that prior CWC/BWC accession by states be required before a state signs the nuclear ban. Today's several or so states that are presumed possessors of chemical or biological weapons or both likely would join the CWC and BWC, whereby they would gain world praise plus probable concrete benefits and, more importantly, then those states could sign the nuclear ban and thereby not impede its progress to unanimous accession and entry into force – which would liberate today's chem-bio possessors, and all states, from the supreme threat posed by existence of nuclear weapons.

\*Frederick N. Mattis (photo on the right) is author of "Banning Weapons of Mass Destruction," published by ABC-Clio/Praeger Security International (ISBN: 978-0-313-36538-6). [IDN-InDepthNews – November 13, 2012]





# BEYOND NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION

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## What Others Say

### Behind the Pakistan-India Nuclear Arms Race

By FELIX IMONTI of Oilprice.com\*



TOKYO - The possibility of a nuclear war between Pakistan and India grows every day. If the Pakistanis do not bring under control the terrorist groups in the country and resolve the conflicts with India, it is not a matter of if it will happen, but when.

There have been few achievements to celebrate in the sixty-five year history of Pakistan and that has made the success of the nuclear program central to the national identity. This is especially true for the military that receives a quarter of the budget and is the only strong national institution.

Development of the weapons started in January of 1972 by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, when he was the Minister for Fuel, Power and Natural Resources. The decision to go nuclear came after a disastrous military defeat in 1971 by India. Bangladesh with Indian assistance separated from Pakistan.

Without its eastern territory, Pakistan was facing an enemy six times larger. The only way to deal with such a threat was to acquire an equalizer. Pakistani Prime Minister Muhammad Ali Bogra stated in 1954, "When there is more equality of military strength, then I am sure that there will be a greater chance of settlement." His words expressed what is an ongoing national preoccupation with military parity with the far more powerful India.

India joined the nuclear club in 1974. Pakistan followed in 1998 and became the only Moslem nuclear power with what became known as the "Islamic Bomb"; and that made it a leader in the Islamic world community.

The Pakistan high command believed that the U.S. does not want a Moslem country to possess nuclear weapons and will at some time in the future attempt to seize or destroy its arsenal. Since September of 2001, much of the American military action has been directed towards Moslem states. As the sole nuclear Islamic country, that convinces the Pakistanis that they too will be targeted.

Washington worries that Pakistan – with a number of terrorist organizations supported by the Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) – is the one place where terrorists would be the most likely to acquire a nuclear weapon or nuclear materials. A high ranking official of the Inter Service Intelligence told the Atlantic for a December 2011 article on the Pakistani nuclear weapons program, "You must trust us that we have maximum and impenetrable security. No one with ill intent can get near our strategic assets."

Since April 2012, The Strategic Plans Division that is charged with protecting the nuclear arsenal of an estimated ninety to one hundred and ten strategic warheads has been adding an additional eight thousand specially trained troops to protect the storage facilities from an American attempt to seize or destroy the nuclear weapons. A retired high level Pakistani officer confided that he and many of his colleagues believe that the U.S. will move against nuclear facilities shortly after the American combat role ends in Afghanistan. He and his colleagues expect the United States to abandon Pakistan as it did in 1989 when the Soviet Union was driven out of Afghanistan.

The raid by U.S. special operation forces into Abbottabad in May of 2011 to kill Osama Bin Laden has been taken as a warning signal by chief of army staff General Ashfaq Kayani what to expect. Senator John Kerry was sent to Pakistan shortly after the raid to explain the American position. He did not reduce the general's anxieties when he declined to provide a written guarantee that the U.S. would not attack the Pakistani nuclear storage facilities. ➡

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\*Felix Imonti is the retired director of a private equity firm and currently lives in Japan. He has recently published a history book, *Violent Justice*, and currently writes articles in the fields of economics and international politics. This article is being republished by arrangement with OILPRICE.COM which carried it on October 28 under the headline *Is Pakistan's Paranoia Pushing it Into a Nuclear War with India?* You can reach Felix at: [feliximonti@gmail.com](mailto:feliximonti@gmail.com)

Picture: A truck-mounted launch system (TEL) armed with 4 Babur cruise missiles on display at the IDEAS 2008 defence exhibition in Karachi. Credit: Wikimedia Commons



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The positioning in the region of units under the United States Joint Special Operations Command is a factor that is feeding the Pakistani paranoia. The task of JOSC is to keep out of the hands of terrorists nuclear materials that were abandoned when the Soviet Union left the Central Asian states. Included in what is seen as a high risk region is Pakistan that is on the list of failed or failing states.

Satellite photos and other sources estimate that there are fifteen locations where weapons or nuclear materials are likely to be kept. Six of these have been attacked by terrorists, although no weapons or materials have been taken.

The generals are probably telling the truth when they say that the weapons are safe in the military facilities. What they are not saying is that their effort to evade detection by the Americans has created other serious flaws in the security.

Nukes are being moved frequently

The assurance that the weapons are safe from attackers collapses once a warhead leaves the guarded facilities. Weapons are being moved frequently in lightly defended ordinary vehicles along public highways to prevent Indian and American spy satellites or snooping drones from tracking the movements. There is little doubt that various extremist organizations have penetrated the military and are aware of the schedules and routes, but ISI acts as if it has enough control over the terrorists to prevent an ambush.

The larger strategic nuclear warheads are often transported disassembled. Recently, though, Pakistan has adopted tactical nuclear weapons with smaller warheads that are easier to move assembled.

In April, ISI released photos of the Nasr, a new sixty kilometre range missile that appears to be capable of delivering a nuclear warhead. Because of the short range of the weapon, it will have to be positioned close to the frontier. That places the missile in a more vulnerable position for a terrorist group to seize while being transported along public highways or in isolated locations.

At the time that Pakistan acquired nuclear weapons, military strategists rejected tactical nuclear weapons because they would provoke the Indians to escalate to strategic weapons in response. That opinion has changed. The addition of a fourth nuclear reactor at Khushab that produces plutonium to be used in tactical weapons says that the inventory will be expanded.

Estimates of the amount of enriched uranium and plutonium in their inventory in 2011 places the potential number of weapons that can be produced at between 160 and 240.

They are developing as well two cruise missiles, two short range shoot and scoot type missiles and two ballistic missiles that will all require different types of warheads and different amounts of materials. They have the fourth largest and fastest growing inventory of warheads of the nine nuclear classified countries. What has never been made clear is when they will feel that they have enough warheads to give them a sense of security.

The military consumes so much of the national budget that the country has been forced to curtail other developments. No other source of revenue is available that will enable the Pakistanis to compete with the Indian military that has a budget three times greater than theirs and a growing diversified economy to support its expansion.

The high command has concluded that the only equalizer for the weaker of the competitors is the tactical nuclear weapon. What makes this a very high risk strategy is the Pakistani first-strike policy.

India nearly retaliated against Pakistan after the 2008 Mumbai attack. That was before Pakistan had begun deploying tactical nuclear weapons. India would have been able to use its superior forces to crush Pakistani defenses.

Should there be another deadly attack by a Pakistan based terrorist organization, especially if it involves a stolen nuclear warhead, the Indians will not hesitate to retaliate. This time, the Indian army will encounter nuclear weapons in the field. Then, Delhi that has no tactical nuclear weapons will have to decide if a strategic response is to be used. The survival of South Asia and far beyond will be depending on that decision. [IDN-InDepthNews – November 7, 2012] ☑



# BEYOND NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION

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## Civil Society Perspective

### Is It Time To Improve Nuclear Disaster Preparedness?

By JOHN LORETZ

[November 5, 2012] The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) proposes to do just that, following a consultation among 16 national member societies more than a year after the Fukushima nuclear reactor disaster.

The world's largest humanitarian organization [announced in May](#) that it would establish "a resource centre offering specialist advice on nuclear disaster preparedness, along with chemical and biological hazards." The center, the IFRC said, will consider "how national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies can be active in helping to protect communities, by raising awareness, helping to manage evacuation if needed and providing psychosocial support and health monitoring in the event of a nuclear disaster."

The IFRC decided to take this initiative, according to its President, Tadateru Konoé, because people "cannot rely solely on governments and on the nuclear industry, which has a vested interest in telling them that everything is safe and nothing can go wrong. It has and it could again, anywhere and at any time."

[Mr. Konoé made a distinction](#) between a response to the use of nuclear weapons and a disaster plan for a nuclear reactor meltdown at IPPNW's 20th World Congress in Hiroshima. The unique and inhumane nature of the nuclear threat has been a consistent message from the Red Cross, from IPPNW, and from major medical associations for decades, and it has only taken on new urgency with the spread of nuclear weapons around the world and the growing number of cities we can only assume are targets.

Mr. Konoé described the powerful new resolution calling for the elimination of nuclear weapons adopted last November by the IFRC Council of Delegates, and he repeated the Federation's long-held position that "nobody has the capability to mount a sufficient response" to the consequences of nuclear war.

In relation to nuclear reactor disasters, however, Mr. Konoé called for "improved...preparedness from the public's point of view."

Is nuclear disaster preparedness more feasible than preparedness for the consequences of nuclear war? Putting aside the question of whether the responsibilities and costs for such preparations should be borne by humanitarian relief organizations, could Red Cross and Red Crescent societies develop or promote more practical, more effective plans than industry-influenced agencies with obvious conflicts of interests? Have technologies and response strategies improved since the 1980s and 1990s, when the emergency plans mandated by regulatory agencies were routinely exposed as shallow public relations exercises?

It's easy to be cynical about this, but I don't criticize the Red Cross for wanting to do more to help the victims of a nuclear disaster than TEPCO or the Japanese government did. I came away from a long conversation with Mr. Konoé convinced that he sees this initiative as keeping faith with the humanitarian mission of the Red Cross and Red Crescent movement.

As of September, the resource center announced in May had not yet been funded or staffed. Hiroto Oyama, the Deputy Director of the President's Office at IFRC headquarters in Geneva, suggested that the first step would be the creation of an advisory group drawn from the national societies that participated in the consultation in Tokyo. One of the first things on their agenda will be to decide whether to focus solely on nuclear disaster preparedness or to take a "multi-hazard approach." Mr. Oyama thought it likely that the resource center would gather together available expertise and resources, rather than commission new studies of criteria for nuclear disaster response plans or evaluate national capacities to implement them.

Such studies, however, could help answer critical questions: Can plausible and effective plans for responding to nuclear reactor disasters be developed at all? What would they entail? What would they cost? If the plans are unaffordable, or can't actually be implemented, is it responsible to keep existing reactors online, let alone build new ones?

Tadatoshi Akiba, the former mayor of Hiroshima, provided me [with a report prepared for him by the Hiroshima City Council for Civil Protection in 2007](#). While the focus of the report was whether the city could prepare for a nuclear weapon attack (the unsurprising conclusion: no), much of the technical detail was derived from reviews of response plans that had been mandated by Japan's Nuclear Disaster Law in 2000, following a series of power plant incidents. ➔



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There are important differences between a nuclear weapons attack and a nuclear reactor disaster. The latter does not produce massive and indiscriminate blast and burn casualties and physical devastation across an entire city, and deaths and injuries come primarily from exposure to radiation, whether to the general population or to first responders. Moreover, the infrastructure needed to treat and assist victims generally remains intact (although the earthquake and tsunami that destroyed the Fukushima plants also wiped out communications, transportation, and safety systems in the region, and placed unsustainable demands on health workers and health care facilities).

Even in the relatively limited situation of a nuclear reactor disaster, however, the authors of the Hiroshima study concluded that “It would be extremely difficult to conduct activities such as disaster status investigation and rescue and guidance of survivors within the strict radiological protection standard” established by the Nuclear Disaster Law. They could find “no scenario that portrays the actual implementation of response plans in combination with a specific depiction of a severe accident.” To the contrary, they pointed to training drills that were conducted under the assumption that local residents would not be exposed to radiation. They even voiced a suspicion “that one reason why the government would not make disaster estimates or formulate specific response plans associated with such estimates is that such estimates or plans suggest the possibility of catastrophic disasters at civilian nuclear facilities.” In other words, if people knew what might really happen and how little could be done to protect them from the consequences, they might have second thoughts about the whole thing.

The Hiroshima study is a valuable model for any city or region that wants to know what exactly to account for in a nuclear disaster plan, whether in response to a nuclear weapons attack or a nuclear plant meltdown: evacuation routes and criteria; emergency transportation and communications systems; blood and medicine stockpiles (e.g., potassium iodide); radiation and burn facilities; shelters; decontamination measures; budgets to support all of these preparations and more.

While the US atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki proved that nothing can be done to mitigate the suffering of the victims of nuclear war, Fukushima (and Chernobyl before it) exposed disgraceful failures on the part of both the nuclear industry and government authorities to adequately protect the health of injured and at-risk populations. In-depth studies of what it would take to do that—and what it would cost in both financial and social terms—could prevent a recurrence of the breakdowns witnessed in post-Fukushima Japan. They could also tip the balance of public opinion toward a rapid phase out of nuclear power, while feeding the sense of urgency for global elimination of nuclear weapons. If national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies were to conduct such studies, they would be providing a public service worthy of their humanitarian mission.

Source: <http://peaceandhealthblog.com/2012/11/05/nuclear-disaster-preparedness/>

## **Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons Oslo, March 4-5, 2013.**

On March 4-5, 2013 the Royal Norwegian Government will host an intergovernmental conference on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons. The conference is expected to discuss in detail the humanitarian impact of a nuclear detonation and will shed some light on the compelling evidence of the unacceptable threat that these weapons pose to our present and future.

The Conference on humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons hosted by Norway will be held at an expert level and is not open to the public. The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) will coordinate the limited civil society participation at the Conference.

For more information, please contact [HC2013@icanw.org](mailto:HC2013@icanw.org)

For more information on the catastrophic consequences of a nuclear detonation please click [here](#).



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## Project Report 2011-2012

**TOWARD A WORLD  
WITHOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS**

2012 Report of the Joint Media Project

Conducted by Inter Press Service (IPS)  
and Soka Gakkai International (SGI)  
in cooperation with Media Network of  
Global Cooperation Council

The logo for Inter Press Service (IPS), featuring a stylized globe with the letters 'IPS' in blue and yellow.

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