By Daryl G. Kimball
The author is Executive Director of the Arms Control Association. Following is the text of an Issue Brief analyzing the prospects beyond the U.S.-North Korean Summit on June 12 in Singapore.
WASHINGTON, D.C. (IDN) – The South Korean-brokered diplomatic opening between leaders from the United States and the Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea (DPRK) that began in January 2018 is a welcome shift away from the missile and nuclear tests and “fire and fury” threats of 2017 that brought the region to the brink of a catastrophic war.
Donald Trump deserves credit for being so bold as to agree to pursue the June 12 summit meeting in Singapore with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. The ongoing inter-Korean dialogue and prospect for a historic U.S.-North Korean summit has lowered tensions but tensions could flare up once again – especially if Trump goes off-script, acts impulsively, or if either side has unrealistic expectations about what the meeting can accomplish.
After creating unrealistic expectations for the planned summit with Kim Jong-un, canceling the encounter and then directing his team to make it happen, Donald Trump finally appears to understand that a single summit cannot resolve the decades-long DPRK nuclear problem.
After meeting with a high-level North Korean official June 1, Trump said the summit was part of a process with North Korea. Indeed, denuclearization of the Korean peninsula will be a years-long endeavor, requiring reciprocal steps.
The long history of U.S.-DPRK nuclear and missile diplomacy underscores the importance of sustaining progress beyond the glow of the initial diplomatic breakthrough. Both sides need to have the political will and courage to follow through on their commitments, and they must have the skills necessary to overcome the implementation and compliance disputes and delays that will inevitably occur down the road.
The overall goal for the Trump administration, and U.S. allies and partners, should be to continue to move as quickly as possible in the right direction: toward halting and reversing and eliminating North Korea’s nuclear strike potential, and away from a worsening crisis involving a growing North Korean nuclear capability and increased risk of war.
For the June 12 summit in Singapore to be a success and to set a course for real, lasting progress, Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un will need to agree on a framework for ongoing direct, expert-level negotiations to hammer out the details and timeframe for specific action-for-action steps on denuclearization, as well as concrete steps toward a peace regime on the Korean peninsula that addresses the security concerns of the DPRK and other states in the region.
On the Same Page?
In the days leading up to the encounter in Singapore, it is still not clear yet whether top U.S. and DPRK leaders are on the same page about the end goals, the pace, and the sequencing of many steps involved in the complete “denuclearization” of the Korean peninsula.
It is also not entirely clear whether the Trump administration itself is of one mind about its own strategy. Top Trump advisors, including National Security Advisor John Bolton and Vice President Mike Pence, contributed to creating a hostile environment just a couple of weeks ahead of the summit by suggesting “the Libya model” for rapid denuclearization by the DPRK with promises of security only coming afterward, and threatening war if North Korea does not agree to a deal.
Given the fact that North Korea has long maintained that its nuclear weapons are a deterrent against U.S. “hostile policy,” it should have been no surprise to the Trump White House that senior North Korean officials lashed out at such an approach.
As the April 2018 Panmunjeom Declaration negotiated by DPRK leader Kim Jong-un and the Republic of Korea’s president Moon Jae-in underscores, the DPRK leadership is only interested in talking about denuclearization if their security interests can be guaranteed.
In the days ahead of the summit, it was reported that “Trump wants Kim to commit to disarmament timetable at summit” but Trump has been advised not to offer any concessions. That is not a winning formula. You don’t get something for nothing when you deal with the DPRK.
The Summit and Beyond
To achieve real, lasting progress, the two sides will need to agree on a framework for sustained, direct, high-level negotiations on the specific action-for-action steps toward denuclearization and a peace regime.
The DPRK denuclearization effort would be without precedent and there is no guarantee of success. No country with a nuclear arsenal and infrastructure as substantial as Kim Jong Un’s, and that has openly conducted nuclear weapon test explosions, has given up its nuclear weapons program.
The DPRK nuclear and missile programs involve dozens of sites, hundreds of buildings, and thousands of people. Rapid progress should be the goal, but as Siegfried Hecker and Bob Carlin note in their recent Stanford University study, a comprehensive denuclearization process is complex and will take years to accomplish.
Near-term priority goals for the Trump administration should be to reach a common understanding Kim Jong-un about what denuclearization entails. A good basis for common understanding would be the 1992 South-North Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
Another near-term priority should be to solidify the DPRK’s declared nuclear and missile testing halt and secure a freeze on fissile material production at all suspected sites, which will help ensure the DPRK cannot expand its arsenal of some 20-60 bombs even further. This could be achieved by:
– Securing the DPRK’s pledge to sign and ratify the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which would help transform its no-test pledge into a legally-binding international commitment, and to secure agreement for on-site inspections by the CTBTO to confirm the closure of its test site. The destruction of the test tunnel entrances at the Punggye-ri nuclear test site is a positive step in the right direction, but it does not permanently prevent it from resuming nuclear tests in the future. Additional tests by the DPRK could be used to achieve further advances in nuclear warhead design. This action step is likely within reach since Pyongyang has recently hinted that it might join the CTBT;
– An agreement to halt further ballistic missile tests, including “space launches,” cease new ballistic missile production and decommission all ICBM launch sites, which could stop the DPRK just short of developing a reliable long-range nuclear strike system;
– Securing a freeze on uranium enrichment and plutonium production, to be verified by the IAEA, which would put a ceiling on the potential number of nuclear devices the DPRK could assemble.
Another early goal should be to secure a commitment by the DPRK to deliver a full declaration on its nuclear infrastructure, nuclear material inventory, and its nuclear weapons stockpile to be verified later by the IAEA, using guideline and techniques established by the Model Additional Protocol for nuclear safeguards, with the support and a legal mandate from the United States and other permanent members of the UN Security Council.
At a later stage, following more intensive expert-level talks, the two sides could agree to a process and a timeline for dismantling weapons stocks and securing separated fissile material stocks under the supervision of a UN Security Council-mandated technical team consisting of specialists from nuclear weapon states, in cooperation with the technical experts from the DPRK.
Facilities that are part of the DPRK’s nuclear complex and its longer-range missile production and deployment infrastructure would also need to be verifiably dismantled or converted under international supervision. This would be a major undertaking that could build upon the experience and lessons learned from U.S. and Russian cooperative threat reduction programs that helped eliminate excess Cold War-era stockpiles and sites.
To achieve real and lasting progress on denuclearization, the U.S. side must be willing to simultaneously take a series of phased, concrete steps to demonstrate it does not have “hostile intent” toward the regime in Pyongyang and that the DPRK’s security and sovereignty does not depend on possessing nuclear weapons.
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo acknowledged this reality in his press briefing May 31 when he noted that the U.S. side will need to convince North Korea’s leadership that their security will be assured—and be even greater—if they make the strategic decision to pursue complete and verifiable denuclearization.
Clearly, differences still need to be ironed out on pacing and sequencing of denuclearization steps and concrete steps to assure the DPRK leadership that they can survive without nuclear weapons. Key measures might include:
- Agreeing to security guarantees, including a commitment not to initiate the use of force against one another;
- Removing U.S. strategic bombers and offensive strike assets, including nuclear-capable systems from U.S. and joint military exercises with allies in the region;
- Formally initiating negotiations on a peace treaty to replace the Korean War Armistice, which would involve talks between U.S., DPRK, Republic of Korea, and Chinese leaders, and pursuing steps toward the normalization of U.S.-DPRK relations, beginning with the opening of a diplomatic interest section in Pyongyang and Washington;
- Jointly reducing military force deployments on both sides of the DMZ in a manner consistent with a future peace treaty.
The Role of Congress
The Trump administration will also need to keep members of Congress better informed on its evolving strategy with regular reports on the negotiations. It will need Congressional advice and support to sustain the process, which will last beyond the life span of the Trump administration.
Members of Congress can and should seek clarification from the Trump administration regarding how it defines the denuclearization process and they should hold the administration accountable as to whether progress is or is not being achieved, but the executive branch will need political space to negotiate the specifics with Pyongyang.
As Senator Robert Menendez, ranking Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee wrote in a May 16 op-ed in The Washington Post, “… even a partial agreement that verifiably begins the process of rolling back North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs would constitute success. Such an agreement should be combined with continued pressure, a strong deterrence posture and a continuation of the emerging North-South dialogue. This would over time provide a reliable pathway to full denuclearization.”
Stay Calm and Carry On
If the planned summit with Kim Jong-un falls apart or does not produce immediate results, Trump must resist the urge to abandon diplomacy and make irresponsible threats, which will only reinforce North Korea’s incentive to further improve its nuclear and missile activities and increase the likelihood of a military confrontation.
There is no viable military option to deal with the North Korean nuclear challenge. A second war with nuclear-armed DPRK would be catastrophic for all sides involved. Tens of millions of people in East Asia and possibly the United States could perish in such a conflict, which would quickly go nuclear.
Trump must also recognize that his policy of “maximum pressure” has real limits. Without a serious, sustained diplomatic effort designed to reach a deal to verifiably halt and reverse the DPRK’s nuclear and missile programs, global support for the existing sanctions regime may erode.
If negotiations between Washington and Pyongyang do ultimately break down, the United States should maintain a principled, sober strategy of diplomacy and deterrence that serves U.S. and allied interests and averts a catastrophic war.
The American people support a diplomatic solution. According to a recent Pew/ Economist/YouGov survey, around 70 percent support direct negotiations between the United States and North Korea, while 62 percent say Trump should not threaten military action against the DPRK if it does not give up its nuclear weapons, according to an ABC/Washington Post poll.
The June 12 encounter will capture the world’s attention. Barring a dramatic breakdown, it will be viewed as a positive first step.
But the true measure of the Singapore summit between Trump and Kim is whether it will actually lead to concrete, steady progress toward the twin goals of denuclearization and the easing of tensions on the Korean peninsula.
The pursuit of disarmament diplomacy is hard work, and when it comes to North Korea, progress never comes easily, but it is better than the alternatives. [IDN-InDepthNews – 9 June 2018]
Photo: North Korea’s Vice Chairman Kim Yong Chol delivers a personal letter from Chairman Kim to President Trump, in the White House Oval Office on June 1, 2018. Credit: Wikimedia Commons.
IDN is flagship agency of the International Press Syndicate.
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